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Bit commitment is a fundamental cryptographic task that guarantees a secure commit-
ment between two mutually mistrustful parties and is a building block for many crypto-
graphic primitives, including coin tossing 1, 2, zero-knowledge proofs 3, 4, oblivious trans-
fer 5, 6 and secure two-party computation 7. Unconditionally secure bit commitment was
thought to be impossible 8–13 until recent theoretical protocols that combine quantum me-
chanics and relativity were shown to elude previous impossibility proofs 14–17. Here we
implement such a bit commitment protocol 17. In the experiment, the committer performs
quantum measurements using two quantum key distribution systems 18 and the results
are transmitted via free-space optical communication to two agents separated with more
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than 20 km. The security of the protocol relies on the properties of quantum information
and relativity theory. We show that, in each run of the experiment, a bit is successfully
committed with less than 5.68×10−2 cheating probability. Our result demonstrates uncon-
ditionally secure bit commitment and the experimental feasibility of relativistic quantum
communication.
Bit commitment is a cryptographic protocol between two distrustful parties. It has two
phases. In the first (commit), the committer, Alice, carries out actions that commit her to a
particular bit value b. In the second (reveal), Alice, if she so chooses, gives the receiver, Bob,
information that unveils b. Bit commitment must be concealing and binding. It is concealing if
Bob cannot learn b before Alice unveils it, and it is binding if Alice cannot change b once she
has committed to it.
In classical cryptography, bit commitment is achieved by utilising computational com-
plexity assumptions such as, for instance, the difficulty of factoring large numbers. However,
the security of such schemes can be broken using a quantum computer19. Indeed, it can be
proven that unconditionally secure bit commitment is impossible using only classical resources.
The same holds true even if Alice and Bob are allowed to use quantum resources in a non-
relativistic scenario 8–13. For this reason, quantum bit commitment schemes rely on physical
assumptions as, for example, that the attacker’s quantum memory is noisy 20. Interestingly,
the picture changes dramatically if we take into account the signalling constraints implied by
the Minkowski causality in a relativistic context. Then, assuming that quantum mechanics is
correct and that space-time is approximately Minkowskian, it has been shown that there are bit
commitment protocols offering unconditional security 16, 17, 21.
The protocol 17 implemented in our experiment involves six parties: Alice and her agents
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A0 and A1, and Bob and his agents B0 and B1. They are distributed in three locations which
are almost aligned, as illustrated in Fig. 1a. The protocol has the following five steps:
1. The first step guarantees the security of the communications between Alice and her
agents. For this purpose, Alice uses quantum key distribution 22, 23 (or, alternatively, a
trusted courier) to share two secret keys, KA0 and KA1 , with A0 and A1.
2. The protocol itself starts when Bob sends Alice N signals (e.g., phase-randomised weak
coherent pulses) prepared in either horizontal, vertical, diagonal or antidiagonal polarised
states, which Bob selects independently and randomly for each signal.
3. To commit to the bit value 0 (1), Alice measures all the incoming signals in the rectilinear
(diagonal) polarisation basis. Then, she uses a public channel to notify Bob which signals
she has detected. Also, she encrypts her measurement results with the one-time pad
(OTP) 24 using the secret keys KA0 and KA1 , and sends them to A0 and A1.
4. To unveil the commitment, agents A0 and A1 decrypt the measurement results received
from Alice and send them to Bob’s agents B0 and B1, respectively.
5. To verify the commitment, Bob compares the results submitted by A0 and A1. If they are
different, Bob rejects the commitment. Otherwise, he estimates a lower bound, nrect, for
the number of single photons sent in the rectilinear basis and detected by Alice. Likewise,
Bob does the same with the signals he sent in the diagonal basis. Let ne,rect (ne,diag) be the
total number of errors in the rectilinear (diagonal) basis. Only when both nrect, ndiag ≥
Ntol and ne,rect ≤ EtolNtol (ne,diag ≤ EtolNtol) Bob accepts the commitment as 0 (1), for
some prefixed parameters Ntol and Etol previously agreed by Alice and Bob.
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The protocol described above is perfectly concealing. This is so because the communica-
tion between Alice and her agents A0 and A1 is guaranteed by the OTP. Also, Bob’s knowledge
of Alice’s detected events does not give him any information about her committed bit. See Ap-
pendix A for a discussion of the security of the protocol against a dishonest Bob. There is also
proven that the protocol is binding. Indeed, it can be shown that Alice’s cheating probability
rapidly approaches zero when Ntol increases, given that Etol is not too large. In our experiment,
this results in a total cheating probability below 5.68 × 10−2. Note, moreover, that this value
comes from a very simple upper bound for the cheating probability, which may not be tight. In
reality, therefore, the cheating probability may be significantly lower.
In the verification step of the protocol it is also important to determine the latest time
instant in which Alice could have made her commitment, given that Bob accepted the revealed
bit. We denote this quantity as tcommit. From the geographical distribution of the different
parties involved in the protocol, it is straightforward to obtain an upper bound for this quan-
tity. This is illustrated in Fig. 2. Here, dij denotes the distance between parties i and j in the
protocol, t0 represents the time instant where Bob sends Alice his first signal, and tB0 (tB1)
is the time instant where agent B0 (B1) receives the last signal from agent A0 (A1). These
parameters are directly observed in the protocol. Furthermore, suppose, for the moment, that
dA0B0 , dA1B1 , dAliceBob,≪ dAliceA0 , dAliceA1 , dA0A1 and Ntol is large (to guarantee a small cheat-
ing probability) and thus the total number of signalsN sent by Bob is also large. In this scenario,
it can be shown that
tcommit ≤ tmax ≡ 1
2
(
tB0 + tB1 −
dA0A1
c
)
− t0, (1)
where c denotes the speed of light in vacuum. A proof of a more general version of this state-
ment can be found in Appendix C.
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The protocol can also guarantee that the commitment is not performed in certain space
points, e.g., in the locations of agents A0 and A1. For this, Bob may verify the conditions
dAliceAi + dA0A1 > c(tBi⊕1 − t0), with i = 0, 1, which assures the latter.
We performed a field test of the protocol among the three geographically separated lab-
oratories shown in Fig. 1a. One important detail to consider in the experiment is that a higher
transmission speed reduces the earliest time where Alice may reveal her committed bit, and thus
it can also reduce the value of tB0 and tB1 . According to Eq. (1), this also decreases tcommit.
The optical communication speed in a free-space channel is 1.5 times higher than in a fiber
channel. Therefore, in our experiment, we choose a free-space channel for the communication
between Alice and her agents. The distance between Alice/Bob’s lab and A0/B0’s lab is about
9.3 km, and the distance between Alice/Bob’s lab and A1/B1’s lab is about 12.3 km. The angle
of A0-Alice-A1 is around 165 degrees.
When an experimental run starts, triggered by a GPS signal, Bob randomly prepares
phase-randomised weak coherent pulses in four different polarisation states and sends them
to Alice. As shown in Fig. 1b, the random pulsed optical signals are emitted from four diodes at
a repetition frequency of 50 MHz. These diodes are controlled by random numbers generated
off line by quantum random number generators (QRNGs). The central wavelength of all laser
diodes is 850 nm, and the average photon number is adjusted to 0.183±10% per pulse. In order
to send more signals within a certain time interval, we utilise two parallel BB84 systems in the
experiment. In each run, Bob sends two sequences of 2838 pulses within 56.76 µs. The delay
between the time when Bob sends his first signal and the triggered GPS signal is measured as
1.53 µs, which is taken as the initial time, t0.
Alice uses a HWP to choose the measurement basis and two SPDs to implement the
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measurement. When she selects the rectilinear basis, bit 0 is committed, whereas when she
chooses the diagonal basis, bit 1 is committed. The detection efficiency, dark count rate and
dead time of each SPD are, respectively, 50%, 100 cps and 30 ns. The total detection efficiency
of the measurement setup is around 45%, including a transmission and collection efficiency of
90% together with the SPD’s detection efficiency. An FPGA board is used to record and process
the detection information. When one detector clicks, the FPGA board records which detector
has clicked and the time instant when this happened. When both detectors click, the FPGA
board records the information of one of them randomly chosen. If there are two detection events
in a 60 ns time interval, the later detection event’s information is dropped. This last procedure
is implemented to keep a dishonest Bob from attacking Alice’s detection device. Meanwhile,
the FPGA board also sends all the detection timing information to Bob through 1 GHz optical
communication. This step is needed to keep a dishonest Alice from cheating 17.
Next, Alice encrypts all her data using the OTP and sends it to her agents A0 and A1 via
1 GHz optical communication. The secret keys KA0 and KA1 for OTP have been generated
using a QRNG and shared between Alice and her agents off line. In order to communicate
through a long distance free-space channel, Alice uses erbium doped fiber amplifiers (EDFAs)
to amplify the optical signals to an average power of 200 mW for the Alice-A0 channel, and 1
W for the Alice-A1 channel. Kepler telescopes with aperture of 80 mm and 127 mm are used
to send the amplified signals to agents A0 and A1, respectively. Cassegrain telescopes with
aperture of 150 mm are used by both agents to receive the signals. In order to achieve a stable
and highly efficient free-space optical channel, we employ the acquiring, pointing and tracking
(APT) technique in both the transmitter and the receiver. The optical signals are then collected
into a multi-mode fiber with a diameter of 62.5 µm. At the output of the fiber, we observe an
average power of more than 100 µW, which is high enough for a classical optical detector.
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A0 and A1 decrypt the optical signals using their own respective secret keys as illustrated
in Fig. 1c. After receiving all the data sent by Alice, they forward the decrypted information to
agents B0 and B1 via 1 GHz optical communication, respectively, to unveil the committed bit
value. Then, B0 and B1 compare the information received together with Bob. If the data sent by
A0 and A1 is not equal, Bob rejects the commitment. Otherwise, he calculates the parameters
nrect, ndiag, ne,rect and ne,diag following the procedure described in Appendix B. Only when
these parameters satisfy the conditions described in the verification step of the protocol, Bob
accepts the commitment. Meanwhile, with the help of their own GPSs, B0 and B1 record the
arrival time of the signals sent by A0 and A1. Based on this timing information, Bob and his
agents determine tcommit according to Eq. (1). All the communications between Alice’s and
Bob’s agents use a bandwidth of 1 GHz.
We performed the experiment 8 times, in half of which Alice commits to the bit value
0 and in the other half she commits to 1. The results are shown in Tab. 1. In each run, Alice
detects around 400 pulses. The total bit error rate is around 1% when the commitment basis
coincides with the preparation basis. This error is mainly due to the optical baseline error and
the detector’s dark counts.
The time interval between commit and unveil is about 30 µs for all the trails. As unveiling
time, which we denote as tunveil, we consider the instant where A0 sends the first signal to B0,
since in our experiment this always happens before A1 sends a signal to B1. From these results,
Bob can also conclude that the commitment was not done in the locations of A0 or A1.
Both quantum mechanics and relativity have changed our understanding of the universe.
Our experiment shows for the first time that when we combine them we can solve a fundamental
problem with many practical applications, and for which there is no solution using only one of
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them on their own. Our work demonstrates that quantum relativistic communication is experi-
mentally feasible, and opens a promising new field for research with technological applications.
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Figure 1 (previous page): (a) Diagram of the geographical distribution of the parties. The dis-
tances between the three main locations are indicated in the figure. The distance between Alice
and Bob, and between A0 and B0 (and A1 and B1) is less than one meter. Alice communicates
with her agents using sending and receiving telescopes. Each site is equipped with a global
position system (GPS) for synchronisation. (b) Diagram of Bob’s and Alice’s setup. Triggered
by a GPS signal, Bob attenuates and encodes laser pulses with a BB84 18 module, which is com-
posed of two Wollason polarisation prisms and a beam splitter, and sends them to Alice. Alice’s
commitment setup consists of a half wave plate (HWP), a polarisation beam splitter (PBS) and
silicon avalanched photo-diode single photon detectors (SPDs). A field programmable gate ar-
ray (FPGA) board is used to record the detected signals and communicate with Bob and Alice’s
agents. Alice encodes, amplifies and sends the measurement results to her agents through tele-
scopes. The four BB84 polarisation states are denoted in the figure as |H〉, |V〉, |+〉 and |−〉.
F.A.: fixed attenuator. OTM: optical transmission module. ORM: optical receiving module.
EDFA: erbium doped fiber amplifies. APT: acquiring, pointing and tracking. (c) Diagram of
B0’s and A0’s setup. The one of B1 and A1 is identical. A0’s FPGA board receives and decrypts
the detection information, stores it until the last classical signal is received, and then sends the
measurement results to B0. Bob’s agents record the timing of these signals and send the results
to Bob.
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Figure 2: Space-time diagram of the experiment. Alice can only have made her commitment
in the intersection (shaded part) of B0 and B1’s past light cones, given that they have received
the signals from A0 and A1. This area is in magenta in the figure. The latest time instant where
Alice could have committed is given by tmax; its projection in space lies on the line connecting
A0 with A1.
15
Exp 1 Exp 2 Exp 3 Exp 4 Exp 5 Exp 6 Exp 7 Exp 8
Bit committed 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1
Bit deduced 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1
ne,i 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
nrect 112 119 126 118 115 109 109 119
ndiag 116 120 107 128 115 122 141 150
ne,i/Ntol 0% 0.93% 0.93% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
tB0 (µs) 92.85 93.02 92.99 92.98 93.18 92.97 93.12 93.24
tB1 (µs) 102.74 102.85 102.92 102.93 103.22 102.84 103.08 103.10
tcommit (µs) 60.54 60.68 60.70 60.70 60.94 60.65 60.84 60.91
tunveil (µs) 90.57 90.62 90.63 90.58 90.62 90.53 90.68 90.68
Table 1: Experimental results when Bob sends Alice two parallel sequences of 2838 pulses.
The parameter ne,i refers to ne,rect (ne,diag) when Alice commits to a bit value 0 (1). In these
experiments we fix the tolerated values Ntol = 107 and Etol = 1.5%, and obtain a cheating
probability below 5.68× 10−2.
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A Security analysis
In this Appendix we analyse the security of the bit commitment protocol implemented. For
this, we use the security proof technique introduced in 21. However, while 21 considers an error-
free case and assumes that Bob sends Alice single-photon pulses, here we analyse the practical
situation where the signals prepared by Bob are phase-randomised weak coherent pulses and
the error rate of the single-photon contributions is below a certain prefixed value Etol (see the
definition of the protocol in the paper).
We begin by introducing some technical definitions. A bit commitment protocol is ǫc-
concealing if Bob cannot learn any information about the committed bit b before Alice unveils
it, except with a minuscule probability ǫc. And, it is ǫb-binding if Bob has a guarantee that 21, 25
p0+ p1 ≤ 1+ ǫb, where p0 (p1) represents the probability that Bob accepts Alice’s commitment
to be 0 (1). Note that the binding condition in quantum bit commitment protocols is slightly
different from that used in classical schemes, which typically requires that either p0 or p1 is very
small after the commit phase. See 21, 25 for a detailed discussion related to this issue. We say
that a commitment is ǫ-secure, with ǫc + ǫb ≤ ǫ, if it is ǫc-concealing and ǫb-binding.
In the next two sections we demonstrate that the bit commitment protocol implemented 17
is perfectly concealing (i.e., ǫc = 0) and ǫb-binding, with ǫb given by Eq. (2). We begin by
proving its security against a dishonest Alice.
Security against a dishonest Alice: The main technical result of this section is Claim 1 below.
It states that the bit commitment protocol considered in the paper is ǫb-binding, with ǫb ap-
proximating zero when Ntol increases, given that the tolerated value Etol is not too large. This
result applies to the general global command model introduced in 21, 26, where it is assumed
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that Alice’s agents A0 and A1 may receive a global command to decide which bit value unveil.
For instance, A0 and A1 could decide to reveal either 0 or 1 depending on some global news
simultaneously available to both of them.
Claim 1: The bit commitment protocol described in the paper is ǫb-binding, with
ǫb ≤ inf
δ∈(Etol,1/2)
{[
1− exp
(
(δNtol − ⌊EtolNtol⌋)2
1−Ntol
)]
21−[1−h(δ)]Ntol (2)
+2 exp
(
(δNtol − ⌊EtolNtol⌋)2
1−Ntol
)}1 + ⌊EtolNtol⌋∑
k=1
(2k − 1)
(
Ntol
k
)+ εrect + εdiag,
where the function h(x) = −x log2 (x) − (1 − x) log2 (1− x) is the binary Shannon entropy
function, Etol denotes the tolerated error rate of the protocol, Ntol represents the minimum
number of single photons prepared in the rectilinear basis (and also in the diagonal basis) that
Alice needs to detect, and εrect and εdiag are the probabilities that the estimation of the terms
nrect and ndiag is incorrect.
Proof. The first fact to notice is that all multi-photon pulses sent by Bob are insecure. This is
so because a dishonest Alice may perform a quantum non-demolition measurement of the total
number of photons contained in each signal. Whenever she observes a multi-photon state, she
can measure one photon in the rectilinear basis and another photon in the diagonal basis. Then
she sends both results to her agents A0 and A1. With this information, and assuming the global
command model, A0 and A1 can always make p0 = p1 = 1. From now on, therefore, we will
consider only the single-photon states sent by Bob and detected by Alice. These are the only
contributions that can make the security parameter ǫb close to zero.
To prove the security of the single-photon pulses sent by Bob we consider a virtual qubit
idea. Instead of preparing a single-photon BB84 state, Bob prepares its purification. That is,
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one can think of Bob actually having a qubit on his side. Then, he generates a signal by first
preparing an entangled state of the combined system of his virtual qubit and the qubit that he is
sending Alice in say a singlet state. He subsequently measures his virtual qubit, thus preparing
a BB84 state. This virtual scheme is completely equivalent to the original one in terms of its
security. More precisely, we will consider that Bob prepares nrect+ndiag singlet states and sends
one qubit from each of these states to Alice, while he keeps the other qubit. Now, in principle,
Bob may keep his nrect + ndiag virtual qubits in a quantum memory and delay his measurement
on them. Only after Alice’s agents A0 and A1 have given all their results to agents B0 and B1,
Bob selects at random nrect virtual qubits and measures them in the rectilinear basis. Likewise,
he measures the remaining ndiag qubits in the diagonal basis.
Now, we need to introduce some further notations 21. Let ρBA0A1 denote the quantum
state shared by Bob and the agents A0 and A1 before the commitment is revealed. Also, let
ΦbA0 (ΦbA1) represent the map applied by agent A0 (A1) with the intention to open the bit value
b. Importantly, the map ΦbA0 (ΦbA1) is restricted to act only on the subsystem hold by A0 (A1).
These two maps produce respectively the output bit strings SA0 and SA1 , which are given to
agents B0 and B1. As described above, only after B0 and B1 have received, respectively, SA0
and SA1 , Bob decides which virtual qubits he measures in the rectilinear basis and which ones
are measured in the diagonal basis. In so doing, we can naturally split the bit string SA0 into
two substrings SA0 = {SA0,rect, SA0,diag}, where SA0,rect (SA0,diag) contains those bits of SA0
associated with events where Bob measures the corresponding virtual qubit in the rectilinear
(diagonal) basis. Likewise, Bob does the same with the bit string SA1 . Also, we split Bob’s
system into Brect and Bdiag. The first (second) subsystem represents those virtual qubits that
Bob measures in the rectilinear (diagonal) basis. That is, we have |Brect| = nrect and |Bdiag| =
ndiag. Moreover, let the quantum operation ΛG,β, with G ∈ {Brect, Bdiag} and β ∈ {rect, diag},
19
correspond to measuring all qubits from subsystem G using the basis β. That is, ΛBrect,rect and
ΛBdiag,diag denote the measurements implemented by Bob in the virtual protocol. The quantum
operation ΛBdiag,rect is not performed in the protocol. However, we will use it for the purposes of
the security proof. The result of applying ΛBrect,rect (ΛBdiag,diag) to Bob’s subsystemBrect (Bdiag)
is a bit string that we shall denote as SBrect (SBdiag). Finally, let ΠbA0 (ΠbA1) be the operation that
Bob uses to check if the results declared by agent A0 (A1) are consistent with committing to a
bit value b.
Using precisely the same arguments of 21, it is easy to show that the security parameter
ǫb is upper bounded by the probability that A0 tries to unveil the bit value 0, A1 tries to unveil
the bit value 1, and both results are accepted by Bob given that he makes a separately decision
for each of these two agents. Next, we calculate an upper bound for this probability. For this,
let σ = ρSBrectSBdiagSA0,rectSA0,diagSA1,rectSA1,diag be the classical state after Bob, A0 and A1 have
made all their measurements (with Ai trying to unveil the bit value i, with i = 0, 1), i.e.,
σ =
(
ΛBrect,rect ⊗ ΛBdiag,diag ⊗ Φ0A0 ⊗ Φ1A1
)
ρBrectBdiagA0A1, (3)
where we already used the fact that B = BrectBdiag. With this notation, we have that ǫb can be
expressed as
ǫb ≤ tr
(
Π0A0Π
1
A1
σ
)
. (4)
Now, in order to evaluate Eq. (4), we introduce two further quantities. In particular, let pA0 be
the probability that A0 passes the test, and let ρpassBdiagSA0,diagA1 be the state conditioned on passing.
That is,
pA0 = tr
[
Π0A0
(
ΛBrect,rect ⊗ Φ0A0
)
ρBrectBdiagA0A1
]
, (5)
ρpassBdiagSA0,diagA1
=
1
pA0
trSBrectSA0,rect
[
Π0A0(ΛBrect,rect ⊗ Φ0A0)ρBrectBdiagA0A1
]
.
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This means that Eq. (4) can be equivalently written as
ǫb
pA0
≤ tr
[
Π1A1(ΛBdiag,diag ⊗ Φ1A1)ρpassBdiagSA0,diagA1
]
. (6)
The term on the r.h.s. of Eq. (6) represents the probability that A1 passes the test con-
ditioned on Bob accepting the result declared by A0. In order for A1 to pass the test, we
need that ne,diag/Ntol ≤ Etol (see the definition of the protocol in the paper). This condi-
tion is equivalent to require that the Hamming distance between SBdiag and SA1,diag is less or
equal than ne,diag ≤ ⌊EtolNtol⌋. That is, to pass the test A1 needs to correctly guess at least
ndiag − ⌊EtolNtol⌋ bits from the bit string SBdiag . Then, using a result from 27 we can obtain a
simple upper for the probability that A1 passes the test,
tr
[
Π1A1(ΛBdiag,diag ⊗ Φ1A1)ρpassBdiagSA0,diagA1
]
≤

1 + ⌊EtolNtol⌋∑
k=1
(2k − 1)
(
ndiag
k
)
× 2−Hmin(SBdiag |A1), (7)
where Hmin(SBdiag |A1) denotes the conditional min-entropy evaluated on the state ρSBdiagA1 =
trSA0,diag(ΛBdiag,diagρ
pass
BdiagSA0,diagA1
). To prove Eq. (7) note that
tr
[
Π1A1(ΛBdiag,diag ⊗ Φ1A1)ρpassBdiagSA0,diagA1
]
=
⌊EtolNtol⌋∑
k=0
pr
[
dH(SBdiag , SA1,diag) = k
]
, (8)
where dH(x, y) denotes the Hamming distance between the bit strings x and y. From 27 we
have that pr
[
dH(SBdiag , SA1,diag) = 0
] ≤ 2−Hmin(SBdiag |A1). Similarly, let SˆBdiag,ndiag−k denote
a substring of SBdiag of size ndiag − k, with k > 0. The probability that A1 guesses correctly
SˆBdiag,ndiag−k and fails in the remaining k bits of SBdiag is upper bounded by
2
−Hmin(SˆBdiag,ndiag−k|A1) − 2−Hmin(SBdiag |A1) ≤ 2−Hmin(SBdiag |A1) (2k − 1) , (9)
where in the inequality we have used the fact that Hmin(SˆBdiag,ndiag−k|A1) ≥ Hmin(SBdiag |A1)−
k. Then, if we take into account all the possible substrings SˆBdiag,ndiag−k contained in SBdiag , we
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have that
pr
[
dH(SBdiag , SA1,diag) = k
] ≤ 2−Hmin(SBdiag |A1) (2k − 1)(ndiag
k
)
, (10)
for k > 0. Combining Eqs. (8)-(10) we obtain Eq. (7).
Now, we employ the uncertainty relation introduced in 28. It states that
Hmax(S˜Bdiag |SA0,diag) +Hmin(SBdiag |A1) ≥ ndiag, (11)
where Hmax(S˜Bdiag |SA0,diag) represents the max-entropy evaluated on the state
ρS˜BdiagSA0,diag
= trA1
(
ΛBdiag,rectρ
pass
BdiagSA0,diagA1
)
. (12)
As already mentioned previously, note that the operation ΛBdiag,rect is not performed in the
protocol. However, we can estimate its result. Combining this result with Eqs. (6)-(7) we find
that
ǫb
pA0
≤

1 + ⌊EtolNtol⌋∑
k=1
(2k − 1)
(
ndiag
k
) 2Hmax(S˜Bdiag |SA0,diag)−ndiag . (13)
The next step is to evaluate the quantity Hmax(S˜Bdiag |SA0,diag). For this, let ne,rect denote
the total number of errors detected in the declaration of A0 (in the rectilinear basis) conditioned
on passing. That is, we have that ne,rect ≤ ⌊EtolNtol⌋. Then, using Serfling inequality 29 for
random sampling without replacement we find that
pr
[
dH
(
S˜Bdiag , SA0,diag
)
≥ δndiag|dH (SBrect , SA0,rect) = ne,rect
]
≤ exp
{
−[√2(δnrect − ne,rect)ndiag]2
nrect(ndiag − 1)(nrect + ndiag)
}
≡ γ
pA0
, (14)
with δ ∈ (Etol, 1/2). That is, Eq. (14) represents an upper bound for the probability of finding
more than δndiag errors between the bit strings S˜Bdiag and SA0,diag given that we observed ne,rect
errors between the bit strings SBrect and SA0,rect.
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Now, we define the binary event Γ as
Γ =


0 if dH(S˜Bdiag , SA0,diag) < δndiag,
1 if dH(S˜Bdiag , SA0,diag) ≥ δndiag,
(15)
and we use the same techniques employed in 21. In particular, it can be shown that
2Hmax(S˜Bdiag |SA0,diag,Γ) ≤
(
1− γ
pA0
)
2ndiagh(δ) + 2ndiag
γ
pA0
, (16)
where h(·) denotes again the binary Shannon entropy function. Now, from 30 we have that
Hmax(S˜Bdiag |SA0,diag) ≤ Hmax(S˜Bdiag |SA0,diag,Γ) + 1. (17)
Combining these results with Eq. (13), we obtain that
ǫb ≤ inf
δ∈(Etol,1/2)
[(
1− γ
pA0
)
21−[1−h(δ)]ndiag + 2
γ
pA0
]
×

1 + ⌊EtolNtol⌋∑
k=1
(2k − 1)
(
ndiag
k
) , (18)
where the parameter γ/pA0 is given by Eq. (14). Finally, if we take into account that ne,rect ≤
⌊EtolNtol⌋ and, moreover, that when A0 and A1 pass the test then nrect, ndiag ≥ Ntol, we obtain
ǫb ≤ inf
δ∈(Etol,1/2)
{[
1− exp
(
(δNtol − ⌊EtolNtol⌋)2
1−Ntol
)]
21−[1−h(δ)]Ntol
+2 exp
(
(δNtol − ⌊EtolNtol⌋)2
1−Ntol
)}1 + ⌊EtolNtol⌋∑
k=1
(2k − 1)
(
Ntol
k
) . (19)
After composing the errors related to the estimation of the parameters nrect and ndiag we obtain
Eq. (2).
In Tab. 1 in the paper we have that Ntol = 107, Etol = 1.5%, and we select εrect = εdiag =
0.21 × 10−2. Using Eq. (2) we obtain, therefore, that ǫb ≤ 0.0568, where the parameter δ that
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minimises Eq. (2) is δ = 0.2953. Since the protocol is perfectly concealing (see next section),
this implies that the committed bits are ǫ-secure, with ǫ ≤ 0.0568.
Let us remark that the upper bound given by Eq. (2) may not be tight, specially when the
number of errors increases. However, since the error rate of our experiment is very low, this
bound is enough for our purposes and we use it for simplicity. One way to improve this result
would be to find a tighter upper bound for the l.h.s. of Eq. (7). If, moreover, this bound is
written in terms of the min-entropy Hmin(SBdiag |A1) then all the security arguments used above
could be applied directly. In reality, therefore, the total cheating probability in the experiment
may be significantly lower than 0.0568.
Security against a dishonest Bob: Clearly, if the probability that Alice detects Bob’s signals
is independent of the measurement basis selected, the bit commitment protocol implemented is
perfectly concealing. This is so because Alice only informs Bob about which signals she has
actually detected and her communication with agents A0 and A1 is encoded with the one-time-
pad (OTP) 24. This means that the probability that a dishonest Bob guesses Alice’s committed
bit correctly is 1/2.
It is therefore essential for any experimental realisation of the protocol to guarantee that
Alice’s detection probability is independent of her measurement choice. To illustrate this point,
below we discuss briefly some potential cheating strategies that a dishonest Bob may try to
implement to obtain the committed bit. They exploit different imperfections of Alice’s threshold
detectors that result in a detection probability that depends on Alice’s basis selection.
Exploiting double clicks: Due to the background noise (i.e., the dark counts of the detectors
together with other possible background contributions) Alice may occasionally observe a si-
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multaneous click in her two detectors. Similar to the situation in quantum key distribution,
double clicks should not be discarded by Alice but they should be assigned to a random click,
as we do in our experiment. Otherwise, a dishonest Bob may exploit double clicks to obtain the
committed bit. For instance, he could send Alice a very strong pulse in say horizontal polarisa-
tion. Clearly, if Alice uses the rectilinear basis to measure the incoming pulse, she will observe
a click in the detector associated to horizontal polarisation. However, if she uses the diagonal
basis, she will observe a double click. If double clicks are discarded, then Bob will learn the
committed bit when Alice informs him about which pulses she detected.
Exploiting the dead-time of Alice’s detectors: Similar to the previous case, a dishonest Bob may
also exploit the dead-time of Alice’s detectors to produce, or not to produce, a click depending
on the measurement basis. For instance, Bob may send Alice two strong pulses prepared in say
horizontal and vertical polarisation, respectively, and separated by a time interval less than the
dead-time. Then, if Alice uses the rectilinear basis, both signals will produce a click. However,
if she uses the diagonal basis, the first signal generates a double click, while the second signal
remains undetected due to the dead-time of the detectors. As above, when Alice informs Bob
about which signals she detected he learns the committed bit.
Even if Alice only accepts clicks which are separated by a time interval greater than the
dead-time of her detectors, a dishonest Bob can obtain the committed bit. For instance, Bob
may send Alice three consecutive strong pulses in the time instants t, t + tdead/2 and slightly
after t + tdead, where tdead represents the dead-time of the detectors. Moreover, suppose that
the first signal is prepared in horizontal polarisation, while the second and the third signals are
prepared in vertical polarisation. Then, if Alice uses the rectilinear basis, she will observe a
click in the first two instants. And she will report Bob a detected event only in the first instant
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(since the first two instants are separated by a time interval smaller than tdead and, therefore, she
discards the second click). However, if she uses the diagonal basis, she will observe a double
click in both the first and last instant. The second signal is never detected due to the dead-time
of the detectors. Again, the information about Alice’s detected events (in particular, whether or
not the third signal is detected) reveals Bob the committed bit.
To avoid this type of attacks and guarantee that the detection probability of Alice is inde-
pendent of her measurement choice, Alice needs to ensure that her measurement results orig-
inate from events where both detectors were active. One simple solution to this problem is to
actively control the dead-time. That is, every time Alice observes a click in any of her detectors,
she disable both detectors for a time period equal to the dead-time. Alternatively, Alice may
also post-select only those clicks that happened after a time period of at least 2tdead without
seeing any click. This last condition guarantees that the post-selected clicks occurred when
both detectors were active. Indeed, this is the solution that we implemented in the experiment,
where the post-selection of data is performed in real time in an FPGA.
B Estimation of the parameters nrect, ndiag, erect and ediag
In this Appendix we show how to estimate the foregoing parameters, which are used by Bob in
the verification step of the protocol to decide whether or not he accepts Alice’s commitment.
We begin by introducing some notations. Let pmulti|rect (pmulti|diag) denote the conditional
probability that Bob sends Alice a signal containing two or more photons, given that he selected
the rectilinear (diagonal) basis. In the bit commitment protocol considered, Bob sends Alice
phase-randomised weak coherent pulses of intensity µ. This means that pmulti|rect and pmulti|diag
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satisfy
pmulti|rect = pmulti|diag ≡ pmulti ≤ 1− [1 + µ (1 + δ)] e−µ(1+δ), (20)
where the parameter δ denotes an upper bound for the intensity fluctuations of the laser diode.
Let Nrect (Ndiag) be the total number of signals sent by Bob in the rectilinear (diago-
nal) basis. And, let Nmulti|rect (Nmulti|diag) represent the total number of multi-photon sig-
nals sent by Bob when he selects the rectilinear (diagonal) basis. The parameters Nmulti|rect
and Nmulti|diag are not directly observed in the experiment but they can be estimated. Using
Chernoff-Hoeffding inequality for i.i.d. random variables 31, 32, we have that
Nmulti|rect ≤ ⌈Nrect(pmulti + δmulti|rect)⌉, (21)
except with error probability εrect given by
εrect = e
−D(pmulti+δmulti|rect||pmulti)Nrect . (22)
Here, D(x||y) = x ln (x/y) + (1 − x) ln [(1− x)/(1− y)] is the Kullback-Leibler divergence
between Bernoulli distributed random variables 33. Similarly, we obtain that Nmulti|diag ≤
⌈Ndiag(pmulti + δmulti|diag)⌉, except with error probability εdiag given by
εdiag = e
−D(pmulti+δmulti|diag||pmulti)Ndiag . (23)
Finally, let Ndetect|rect (Ndetect|diag) denote the total number of signals declared as detected
by Alice when Bob selected the rectilinear (diagonal) basis. Combining the results above, we
have that
nrect ≥ Ndetect|rect − ⌈Nrect(pmulti + δmulti|rect)⌉,
ndiag ≥ Ndetect|diag − ⌈Ndiag(pmulti + δmulti|diag)⌉, (24)
27
expect with error probability ε ≤ εrect + εdiag. To derive Eq. (24) we have assumed the worse
case scenario where all multi-photon signals sent by Bob are actually declared as detected by
Alice. The parameters Ndetect|rect, Ndetect|diag, Nrect and Ndiag are observed in the experiment,
the probabilities pmulti|rect and pmulti|diag are fixed by Bob’s state preparation process, and the
terms δmulti|rect and δmulti|diag can be obtained using Eqs. (22)-(23) for any given value of the tol-
erated error probabilities εrect and εdiag. These quantities are shown in Tab. 2 for the experiment
reported in the paper.
The calculation of ne,rect and ne,diag is straightforward. We consider a worse case scenario
where all the errors observed are assumed to affect only the single photon signals sent by Bob.
That is, ne,rect (ne,diag) is directly given by the total number of errors in the rectilinear (diagonal)
basis.
In the experiment reported in the paper µ = 0.183 and δ ≤ 0.1. According to Eq. (20),
this means that pmulti ≤ 0.0177.
C Estimation of the parameter tcommit
In this Appendix we show how to estimate an upper bound for tcommit, i.e., the latest time instant
where Alice could have made her commitment, given that Bob accepted the revealed bit.
Our starting point is the geographical distribution of the different parties involved in the
protocol. It is illustrated in Fig. 3a. Three important observables in the experiment are the time
instants t0, tB0 and tB1 . The first one represents the time instant where Bob sends Alice his
first signal, while tB0 (tB1) is the time instant where agent B0 (B1) receive the last signal from
agent A0 (A1). In order to find an upper bound for tcommit we will assume, for simplicity, a very
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Ndetect|rect Ndetect|diag nrect ndiag
Exp 1 189 193 112 116
Exp 2 196 197 119 120
Exp 3 203 184 126 107
Exp 4 195 205 118 128
Exp 5 192 192 115 115
Exp 6 186 199 109 122
Exp 7 186 218 109 141
Exp 8 196 227 119 150
Table 2: Parameters nrect and ndiag given by Eq. (24) when Bob sends Alice two parallel se-
quences of 2838 pulses. They correspond to the results reported in Tab. 1 in the paper. The
quantities Nrect = Ndiag = 2838, pmulti ≤ 0.0177 and εrect = εdiag = 0.21× 10−2. This implies
δmulti|rect = δmulti|diag = 0.00937.
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Figure 3: (a) Geographical distribution of the different parties involved in the protocol. (b)
We consider that a dishonest Alice has access to all the N signals that Bob sends her in one
run of the protocol already at the time instant t0 and in a space point infinitely close to Bob.
(c) A dishonest Alice may store all the signals sent by Bob in a quantum memory and move
the memory with her at the speed of light to a certain space point Pcommit favourable for her
commitment. (d) The distance dBobPcommit is always less or equal than a certain maximum
distance dBobPmaxcommit . If Alice has time to arrive at the space point P
max
commit (in the line connecting
the agents B0 and B1), it is better for her (in order to increase the value of tcommit) to stay at
Pmaxcommit and wait there, rather than moving somewhere else.
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conservative scenario in which Alice has access (at already the time instant t0 and in a space
point infinitely close to Bob) to all the N signals that Bob sends her in one run of the protocol.
Also, we will consider that B0 and B1 receive the signals from A0 and A1 altogether at time
instants tB0 and tB1 , respectively. This is illustrated in Fig. 3b.
In practice, a dishonest Alice has some time to make her commitment, and typically she
wants to commit as late as possible. For this, she can store all the signals sent by Bob in a
quantum memory and move the memory with her at the speed of light to a certain space point
favourable for her commitment. This is illustrated in Fig. 3c, where Pcommit denotes the space
point selected by Alice to make her commitment. This commitment point needs to satisfy the
following two conditions
tB0 ≥ t0 +
dBobPcommit + dPcommitB0
c
,
tB1 ≥ t0 +
dBobPcommit + dPcommitB1
c
, (25)
where c denotes the speed of light in vacuum. That is, the total time needed to move the signals
sent by Bob at t0 through the paths dBobPcommit and dPcommitB0 (dBobPcommit and dPcommitB1) should
be less or equal to tB0 (tB1).
The parameters dPcommitB0 and dPcommitB1 can be expressed as a function of the distance
dBobPcommit and the angle of B0-Bob-Pcommit, which we denote as Ψ, as follows
dPcommitB0 =
√
d2BobB0 + d
2
BobPcommit
− 2dBobB0dBobPcommit cosΨ,
dPcommitB1 =
√
d2BobB1 + d
2
BobPcommit
− 2dBobB1dBobPcommit cos (θ0 + θ1 −Ψ), (26)
where the distances dBobBi , together with the angles θi (see Fig. 3b), with i = 0, 1, are given by
dBobBi =
√
d2AliceBob + (dAliceAi + dAiBi)
2 + 2dAliceBob(dAliceAi + dAiBi) cos (θ/2),
θi = arccos {[dAliceBob + (dAliceAi + dAiBi) cos (θ/2)] /dBobBi}, (27)
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where θ is the angle of A0-Alice-A1.
Combining these expressions with Eq. (25) we have that
c(tB0 − t0) ≥ dBobPcommit +
√
d2BobB0 + d
2
BobPcommit
− 2dBobB0dBobPcommit cosΨ, (28)
c(tB1 − t0) ≥ dBobPcommit +
√
d2BobB1 + d
2
BobPcommit
− 2dBobB1dBobPcommit cos (θ0 + θ1 −Ψ).
Also, the distance dBobPcommit is always less or equal than dBobPmaxcommit (see Fig. 3d). If
Alice has time to arrive at the space point Pmaxcommit, it is better for her (in order to increase the
value of tcommit) to stay at Pmaxcommit and wait there, rather than continuing to move somewhere
else. We have, in particular, that
dPmax
commit
B0 = qdB0B1 ,
dPmax
commit
B1 = (1− q)dB0B1 , (29)
with the distance dB0B1 given by
dB0B1 =
√
d2BobB0 + d
2
BobB1
− 2dBobB0dBobB1 cos (θ0 + θ1), (30)
and where the term q has the form
q =
1
2
[
1− c
dB0B1
(tB1 − tB0)
]
. (31)
This last result comes from the following. After the commitment, we have that (in the worse
case scenario) dPmax
commit
B1/c − dPmaxcommitB0/c = tB1 − tB0 . That is, using Eq. (29) we obtain
(1− 2q)dB0B1 = c(tB1 − tB0), which is equivalent to Eq. (31).
After some simple calculations, we obtain that dBobPmax
commit
is given by
dBobPmaxcommit =
√
ξ2 + (dBobB1 − δ)2, (32)
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where the parameters ξ and δ are given by, respectively,
ξ = (1− q)dBobB0 sin (θ0 + θ1),
δ = (1− q)dB0B1 cos (β), (33)
and where the angle β has the form β = arcsin [(dBobB0/dB0B1) sin (θ0 + θ1)].
Based on the foregoing, we find that dBobPcommit in Fig. 3c can be obtained solving the
following constrained optimisation problem
max
Ψ
dBobPcommit
s.t. 0 ≤ Ψ ≤ θ0 + θ1
dBobPcommit +
√
d2BobB0 + d
2
BobPcommit
− 2dBobB0dBobPcommit cosΨ ≤ c(tB0 − t0),
dBobPcommit +
√
d2BobB1 + d
2
BobPcommit
− 2dBobB1dBobPcommit cos (θ0 + θ1 −Ψ) ≤ c(tB1 − t0),
0 ≤ dBobPcommit ≤ min
[
c(tB0 − t0), c(tB1 − t0), dBobPmaxcommit
]
. (34)
Let dsolBobPcommit denote the solution to this optimisation problem. This solution can be ob-
tained using either analytical or numerical methods. Then we need to consider two cases. If
dsolBobPcommit = dBobPmaxcommit , this means that Alice has time to arrive at P
max
commit and wait there
before she makes her commitment. That is, combining Eqs. (29)-(31) with the fact that
tB0 ≥ t0 + tcommit +
dPcommitB0
c
,
tB1 ≥ t0 + tcommit +
dPcommitB1
c
. (35)
we find that tcommit is upper bounded by
tcommit ≤ tB0 − t0 −
qdB0B1
c
=
1
2
(
tB0 + tB1 −
dB0B1
c
)
− t0
≈ 1
2
(
tB0 + tB1 −
dA0A1
c
)
− t0, (36)
33
where in the last equality we used dA0B0 , dA1B1 , dAliceBob,≪ dAliceA0 , dAliceA1 , dA0A1 , which
means that dB0B1 ≈ dA0A1 . Eq. (36) corresponds to the typical situation where the total number
of signals N sent by Bob is large and thus also tB0 and tB1 are large.
The second case is when dsolBobPcommit < dBobPmaxcommit . In this situation Alice has to make her
commitment before she can arrive at Pmaxcommit. This means that tcommit is directly given by
tcommit =
dsolBobPcommit
c
. (37)
This is the minimum time needed to arrive at the point Pcommit (see Fig. 3c).
Finally, to verify that the commitment is not performed in certain space points like, for
instance, in the locations of A0 and A1, Bob needs to confirm that the following two conditions
are fulfilled: dBobA0 + dA0B1 > c(tB1 − t0) and dBobA1 + dA1B0 > c(tB0 − t0). The first
condition assures that there is no time for the signals to travel from Bob to A0, and from A0
to B1, before tB1 (and similarly for the second condition). When dA0B0 , dA1B1 , dAliceBob,≪
dAliceA0, dAliceA1, dA0A1 these conditions reduce to the ones presented in the paper.
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